30 Eylül 2012 Pazar

Why is this so difficult for employers?

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A recent report from the Treasury Inspector General For Tax Administration (TIGTA), said they found weaknesses in the IRS's procedures for ensuring taxpayer compliance with worker status determinations.
"The misclassification of employees as independent contractors is a nationwide problem affecting millions of employees," J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration stated. "Left unchecked, it will continue to grow and contribute to the tax gap. The IRS should do more to ensure that the burden of uncollected taxes is not shifted to compliant taxpayers."
The IRS allows both employers and workers to request determination letters from the agency regarding the worker's tax status as an employee or independent contractor. While this determination is binding, TIGTA reported that employers often fail to withhold taxes even though the IRS has stated that the worker is properly classified as an employee. The IRS created Form 8919 so that employees in these circumstances could report their personal liability for Social Security and Medicare wages. Nevertheless, TIGTA found that employees may be abusing Form 8919 in order to avoid payment of employment taxes and estimated that 74,068 taxpayers avoided $26.2 million in Social Security and Medicare taxes, and the IRS could lose $131 million in Social Security and Medicare taxes over the course of the next five years as a result.
The IRS disagreed with TIGTA's valuation of this amount, pointing out situations where a taxpayer could receive relief when the taxpayer could be ruled an independent contractor by a court and would not have an employment tax liability.
What really intrigues me is why it is so difficult for employers to determine whether someone is an independent contractors or an employee? There are several EDD resources out there and the best one s I’ve found over the years is a simple yes and no questionnaire. Answer too many questions with a “yes” and you know you’ve got an employee on your hands no matter how much you’d wish the person could be classified as an independent contractor.
The form is on the CEA website in the resources tab, or go to: http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de38.pdf
Established in 1937, CEA is a non-profit association providing personalized and cost effective comprehensive information, services, and training for all aspects of human resources management,California Labor Law and relations solutions throughout California. Located throughout the state, CEA’s staff of regional directors draw upon more than 150 years combined knowledge and experience to assist in all aspects of employer-employee relations.
For more information please contact:
Scott J. Dear, Director of Membership Services
Toll free 1-800-399-5331 or 916-921-1312
Mobile 916-281-5898
Email: sdear@employers.org
Website:http://www.employers.org/
Twitter:Caemployers

Worker Compensation Update

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It is important to clarify when employees are eligible for workers’ compensation benefits and explain what you should and shouldn’t do if an employee is injured on the job. This seminar will discuss:

• When is an employee eligible for worker's compensation benefits?
• Dos and Don'ts when an employee gets injured on the job.
• 2011 changes to the workers' compensation system.
• New legislation and court rulings from 2010.
• Why offer modified work, and what to do when it is refused by your employee.
• Communicating with your injured workers – how and why.


Click on location below for details
Costa Mesa, CA
Date: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 09:00 AM
Duration: 1 Hour 30 Minutes
Continental breakfast
Orange County Dept. of Education
200 Kalmus Dr. Costa Mesa, CA

San Diego, CA
Date: Tuesday, March 16, 2011 at 09:00 AM
Duration: 1 Hour 30 Minutes
Continental breakfast
DeVry University
2655 Camino Del Rio N., Suite 201 San Diego, CA 92108

Fresno, CA
Date: Tuesday, March 29, 2011 at 12:00 PM
Duration: 1 Hour 30 Minutes
Lunch included
Piccadilly Inn Airport
5115 E. McKinley Fresno, CA 93727

Established in 1937, CEA is a non-profit association providing personalized and cost effective comprehensive information, services, and training for all aspects of human resources management,California Labor Law and relations solutions throughout California. Located throughout the state, CEA’s staff of regional directors draw upon more than 150 years combined knowledge and experience to assist in all aspects of employer-employee relations.


For more information please contact:
Scott J. Dear, Director of Membership Services
Toll free 1-800-399-5331 or 916-921-1312
Mobile 916-281-5898
Email: sdear@employers.org
Website:www.employers.org
Twitter:Caemployers

Announcing CEA HR 101 for California workshop

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How many hats do you wear each day?

Office Manager, Human Resource Manager or Have-To-Do-It-All Manager? With all you have to do, staying up to date on human resource practices may fall to the bottom of your to-do list.

CEA to the rescue! Due to popular demand, CEA has created a brand new training called HR 101 (for California). In this small class size, we will cover the essentials of human resources on a more personal level.

Our first scheduled class was held in Sacramento click here for sample flier. If you would like us to offer this class in your area, please email Scott Dear for more information



Established in 1937, CEA is a non-profit association providing personalized and cost effective comprehensive information, services, and training for all aspects of human resources management,California Labor Law and relations solutions throughout California. Located throughout the state, CEA’s staff of regional directors draw upon more than 150 years combined knowledge and experience to assist in all aspects of employer-employee relations.

For more information please contact:
Scott J. Dear, Director of Membership Services
Toll free 1-800-399-5331 or 916-921-1312
Mobile 916-281-5898
Email: sdear@employers.org
Website: www.employers.org
Twitter: Caemployers

Employee or Independent Contractor? The IRS will decide!

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Three-year study. The IRS is randomly selecting 2,000 returns from all types of employers in the private, tax-exempt, and government sectors as part of the three-year NRP payroll tax audit that began in February 2010. "This is the first time the IRS has conducted an employment tax study since the early 1980s. Based on studies from more than 10 years ago, the IRS has estimated that employment tax underreporting accounts for approximately $54 billion of the $345 billion tax gap (the difference between what taxpayers owe and what they pay). In other words, the IRS wants to be sure they are getting the proper amount of payroll taxes they are due.

Under Review. Employers selected for participation should expect to provide the IRS with a variety of documents, including:

• payroll tax records
• W-2 forms
• exemption worksheets (the IRS is taking a close look at worker classification).

Misclassifying a worker as an independent contractor, when they should actually be classified as an employee, can result in liability for employment taxes and for the 100-percent penalty for failure to collect and account for employment taxes. The IRS uses three characteristics to determine the relationship between businesses and workers --behavioral control, financial control, and the nature of the relationship.

The Test. The basic test for determining whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee is whether the principal(boss/owner) has the right to direct and control the manner and means by which the work is performed. When the principal has the "right of control," the worker will be an employee even if the principal never actually exercises the control. If the principal does not have the right of direction and control, the worker will generally be an independent contractor.
What to Do. We encourage all employers to review the classification of all your independent contractors. Using the EDD employment determination guide, found at: http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de38.pdf an owner can determine whether a worker is most likely an employee or an independent contractor.

More questions? Give us a call, we can provide you with exemption worksheets and help you properly classify all of your employees!


JOIN CEA TODAY!

Established in 1937, CEA is a non-profit association providing personalized and cost effective comprehensive information, services, and training for all aspects of human resources management,California Labor Law and relations solutions throughout California. Located throughout the state, CEA’s staff of regional directors draw upon more than 150 years combined knowledge and experience to assist in all aspects of employer-employee relations.

For more information please contact:
Scott J. Dear, Director of Membership Services
Toll free 1-800-399-5331 or 916-921-1312
Mobile 916-281-5898
Email: sdear@employers.org
Website: www.employers.org
Twitter: Caemployers

Webinar: Worker's Compensation Update March 30th

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It is important to clarify when employees are eligible for workers’ compensation benefits and explain what you should and shouldn’t do if an employee is injured on the job. This seminar will discuss:


• When is an employee eligible for worker's compensation benefits?
• Dos and Don'ts when an employee gets injured on the job.
• 2011 changes to the workers' compensation system.
• New legislation and court rulings from 2010.
• Why offer modified work, and what to do when it is refused by your employee.
• Communicating with your injured workers – how and why.

HRCI Approved:
The use of this seal is not an endorsement by the HR Certification Institute of the quality of the program. It means that this program has met the HR Certification Institute’s criteria to be pre-approved for recertification.

Speaker: Steven Roberts Esq
Date: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 At 12:00 PM
Duration: 1 Hour

Mr. Roberts is a partner in the workers’ compensation defense firm of Yrulegui and Roberts. He is certified by The State Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization as a specialist in Workers’ Compensation.

He has full range of trial experience including all phases of workers’ compensation litigation; appellate court hearings and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board trials.

Registration information Click Here



Established in 1937, CEA is a non-profit association providing personalized and cost effective comprehensive information, services, and training for all aspects of human resources management,California Labor Law and relations solutions throughout California. Located throughout the state, CEA’s staff of regional directors draw upon more than 150 years combined knowledge and experience to assist in all aspects of employer-employee relations.

For more information please contact:
Scott J. Dear, Director of Membership Services
Toll free 1-800-399-5331 or 916-921-1312
Mobile 916-281-5898
Email: sdear@employers.org
Website: www.employers.org
Twitter: Caemployers

29 Eylül 2012 Cumartesi

U.S. Supreme Court: Wal-Mart Class Action Too Big; No Commonality

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In the closely watched case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al., the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday torpedoed what would have been the largest class-action lawsuit in American history against the nation's largest private employer.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the proposed class, which would have consisted of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart, who have alleged the presence of a corporate culture of gender and sex discrimination against women, failed to meet the "commonality" requirement for permissible class certification.

"Commonality" is a prerequisite set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that there exist "questions of law or fact common to the class," before a group may properly be certified as a class. One of the tests by which commonality may be established is by setting forth "significant proof" that an employer "operated under a general policy of discrimination."

In short, the majority held that significant proof of a "general policy of discrimination" on behalf of Wal-Mart was entirely absent in this case. The majority noted that not only was plaintiff's sociological expert unable to provide a definitive opinion on this issue, but also that Wal-Mart's corporate policy is to provide each of its local supervisors with discretion over employment matters - a policy that is, by definition, the opposite of having the type of uniform employment practice that is needed to establish commonality for purposes of class certification.

The majority also held that the plaintiffs had failed to identify and challenge a specific employment practice that was alleged to be discriminatory and which was common to all 1.5 million class members.

The Court's decision to deny certification in this case is significant in that it will have a significant impact upon future discrimination claims against large employers, undoubtedly making it harder for plaintiffs to achieve class-status. Class-actions are, in many instances, the only real vehicles by which discriminatory policies or actions by large or multi-national employers can be successfully challenged. As compared to small, individual claims, class-actions with numerous class members often carry with them the prospect of very large verdicts that can quickly change (or destroy) a corporate image and bottom-line. Additionally, the economics of many discrimination claims (such as wage-and-hour claims) are simply not worth an attorney's time or money prosecuting on behalf of a single employee, as the potential recoverable damages often cannot justify the time and expense necessary to prevail through trial. Unfortunately, if class-actions now become harder to certify and maintain following this case, the sad truth is that many instances of discrimination or employment law violations may simply go unchecked or unchallenged.

You can read the Supreme Court's full opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf

Think supervisors and employers are immune from retaliation claims because employee discipline is recommended by an internal review committee? Think again.

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In McKenna v. City of Philadelphia (8/17/2011) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Philadelphia Police Department's use of an internal disciplinary review committee to recommend an officer's termination did not insulate that officer's supervisor, or the City itself, from charges of unlawful retaliation and termination. In so doing, the Court analyzed and applied the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, in which the Court held that an employer may be held liable for unlawful discrimination based upon the discriminatory motivation of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate adverse employment decision. (To read more about the Staub decision, see my earlier post on this blog here: http://paemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2011/03/us-supreme-court-adopts-cats-paw-theory.html

McKenna involved a former Caucasian Philadelphia police officer, Raymond Carnation, who testified that he used to work in a police squad that experienced significant internal racial tensions. Shortly after Sgt. John Moroney was named as the permanent supervisor of Carnation's squad, Carnation complained to Moroney of the issues involving racial tensions within the squad. Carnation also complained to the local district commander, Captain William Colarulo, about the racial tensions. When nothing appeared to be happening to change the environment within the squad, Carnation told Colarulo that he thought Moroney was condoning racism by failing to address the issues Carnation had complained of. Carnation also told Moroney that he thought Moroney was contributing to the problems by failing to take action.

As a direct consequence of making these complaints, Carnation testified that he was subjected to retaliation, such as being assigned unassisted duty in dangerous neighborhoods in unpleasant weather conditions. In another instance, Carnation testified that Colarulo told him that if Carnation filed an EEOC complaint, Colarulo would make Carnation's life "a living nightmare," and ordered Carnation to apologize for making his previous accusations.

In May of 1997, Carnation attempted to call Moroney at the district, in order to speak with him. Carnation received a telephone call back from Colarulo, who ordered Carnation to "not call Sgt. Moroney." The next Saturday, however, Carnation called Moroney and spoke with him about his concerns surrounding the racial issues in the squad. The next day, Carnation called Colarulo, who was off duty and on vacation for the Memorial Day holiday, and told Colarulo that he had spoken to Moroney and resolved many of his concerns, but still wanted to schedule a meeting between all three of them. Colarulo refused to schedule a meeting.

After the Memorial Day holiday, Colarulo served Carnation with disciplinary papers relating to the phone calls that had been placed over the weekend, and brought charges of insubordination, using profane or insulting language to a superior officer, and neglect of duty for failing to comply with oral orders of a superior, against Carnation.

As per Philadelphia Police Department procedures, the charges were then sent to an internal disciplinary board called the "Police Board of Inquiry" or "PBI." The PBI is a three-member panel of police officers, which listens to the evidence before it and then decides what proper sanction, if any, that it will recommend to the Police Commissioner, who holds the power to impose any recommended sanctions.

Carnation pled "not guilty" to the charges against him, and a hearing was held before the PBI, at which Carnation was represented by private counsel, and testified on his own behalf, as did Colarulo. The PBI found Carnation guilty of all three counts brought by Colarulo and, on its own initiative, added a fourth charge of conduct unbecoming an officer. The PBI then recommended Carnation's termination to the Police Commission, who approved the same.

Carnation subsequently filed suit against the City of Philadelphia, alleging unlawful retaliatory termination in violation of Title VII. The jury found that Carnation's termination constituted illegal retaliation that stemmed from his protected activity of complaining about racial discrimination to Colarulo and Moroney during the Memorial Day weekend, and awarded Carnation $2,000,000.00 in compensatory damages.

The City appealed from the district court's decision upholding the jury verdict, arguing that the City could not be held liable for any retaliatory animus held by Colarulo against Carnation, as a matter of law, because Carnation's termination was not carried out by Colarulo. Rather, Carnation's termination was carried out by a separate, internal disciplinary board that made its recommendation to dismiss Carnation only after receiving testimony and evidence in an unbiased, neutral due-process hearing.

The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the jury's verdict against the City. The Court rejected the City's arguments that the use of the PBI insulated the City and Colarulo from liability as a matter of law. Specifically, the Court recognized that in Staub, the Supreme Court held that the test for analyzing whether an employer can be held liable for the discriminatory or retaliatory animus of a non-decisionmaker was not whether the non-decisionmaker exerted "singular influence," over the eventual adverse employment action, but rather whether the non-decisionmaker's animus was the "proximate cause," of the adverse employment action suffered by the employee. The Third Circuit noted that "proximate causation requires only some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged and excludes only those links that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect." The Court held that the record in this case was insufficient to establish that the PBI's role in Carnation's dismissal rose to such a superseding level that it rendered any retaliatory animus harbored by Colarulo remote, purely contingent or indirect. Rather, the Court held that on the evidence presented, the jury was justified in finding that Colarulo's retaliatory animus "bore a direct and substantial relation to Carnation's termination and that the PBI's recommendation was not independent and was foreseeable." This conclusion was further supported by the Staub decision, in which the Supreme Court itself noted that "[a] supervisor's biased report may remain a casual factor if [an] independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor's recommendation, entirely justified. . ."

This case illustrates that, following the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Staub, an employer cannot rely upon the use of an internal disciplinary review process to always insulate it from liability for discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, even when the individuals who participate in the review process have no relation to the employee or to the supervisor who may have recommended disciplinary action.

To read the Third Circuit's full opinion in McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, click here: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/093567p.pdf

Supervisor who is terminated for asking subordinates for a loan is not entitled to unemployment compensation

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In Weingard v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No.: 2729 C.D. 2010 (Pa. Cmwlth. 8/10/2011), the Commonwealth Court held, in a matter of first impression, that a supervisor who is fired for requesting a substantial loan from a subordinate is not entitled to receive unemployment compensation, even if the employer does not have a specific rule prohibiting the solicitation of loans in the workplace. The Court held that such a request constitutes a disregard of the standards of behavior an employer has a right to expect from its employees.

In this case, Weingard learned that a co-worker was selling a motorcycle for $1,000.00 and he wanted to buy it. But, due to his poor credit history, Weingard knew that he would be unable to obtain a loan from a bank. So, Weingard asked his supervisor for a $1,000.00 loan and was turned down. Weingard then asked five other employees - at least one of whom was Weingard's subordinate - if he could borrow the $1,000.00 and was similarly rejected. One of the employees who was supervised by Weingard complained to Weingard's supervisor about Weingard's request to borrow money, indicating that it made her uncomfortable. The employer conducted a three-week investigation into the matter, after which it terminated Weingard for his requests to borrow money, deeming such an action to be "coercive."

The employer's handbook did not contain any specific rules regarding the lending or borrowing of money between supervisors and subordinates, but did prohibit employees from "operating or acting in any manner that is contrary to the best interests of Employer."

Weingard then filed for unemployment compensation benefits. The Unemployment Compensation Referee granted benefits to Weingard, finding that the employer had failed to meet its burden to establish the existence of a rule regarding the lending or borrowing of money between supervisors and subordinates, and that a violation of that rule could result in termination.

On appeal, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review reversed, holding that the employer had in fact established the existence of a policy that prohibited Weingard from acting in a manner that was contrary to the employer's best interests. The Board thus denied Weingard unemployment compensation benefits.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Board that denied Weingard unemployment compensation benefits, but did so on different grounds. The Court found that employer's general policy that prohibited employees from "operating or acting in any manner that is contrary to the best interests of Employer," was "so general as to be meaningless to this appeal." The Court held that the Board committed error when it found that Weingard had knowingly violated this vague standard because "[Weingard] testified that he did not know there was a policy prohibiting him from soliciting loans from co-workers, and he did not believe that asking another employee for a loan harmed Employer's interest in any way. Employer provided no evidence to the contrary." Thus, the Court found the Board's conclusion that Weingard had committed willful misconduct by knowingly violating a work rule, was erroneous.

The Court nevertheless determined that Weingard was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Examining for the first time whether a supervisor's request of a substantial loan from a subordinate constitutes willful misconduct, the Court found that in asking to borrow $1,000.00 from a subordinate, "[Weingard] used his position of authority in an unseemly way. He may not have used overt threats or direct coercion, but that fact is not dispositive of the issue. [Weingard] held the upper hand in the relationship with the employees he supervised. . . There is an unspoken, and implicit, coercion when a boss makes a request for a significant loan of an employee under his supervision." Therefore, the Court concluded that while Weingard may not have violated a specific written rule of his employer regarding money-lending between employees, his conduct "violated the standards of behavior his Employer had a right to expect," from its employees, which constituted willful misconduct that disqualified him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.

The moral of the story? If you need a loan, go to a bank.

You can read the WeingardCourt's full opinion here: http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2726CD10_8-10-11.pdf

In Title VII Cases, Sometimes It's All About the Numbers. . .

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On September 28, 2011, in the case of Meditz v. City of Newark the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court had improperly dismissed a lawsuit against the City of Newark, which alleged that the City's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees was unlawful under Title VII because it created an employment bias against white, non-Hispanic applicants. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had failed to properly evaluate and consider the weight of the statistical evidence that had been presented by the plaintiff. In April of 2007, Gregory Meditz, a white male who resided in neighboring Rutherford, New Jersey, applied for a non-uniformed job with the City of Newark. Meditz was turned down for the job because he did not live in the City of Newark, and thus did not qualify for employment under a City Ordinance that required all non-uniformed City personnel to live within the City limits. Meditz sued, claiming that the City's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees was discriminatory and unlawfully barred him from qualifying for a non-uniformed job with the City. Specifically, Meditz argued that the residency requirement worked a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanic job applicants because the racial make-up of the population of Newark did not reflect the racial make-up of the surrounding labor market. In support of his claims, Meditz produced statistical data that he gathered from publicly available sources, which revealed that in 2007, only 9.4% of the non-uniformed employees of the City of Newark were white, non-Hispanic, while 28.31% of the City's uniformed employees (who are not subject to a residency requirement) were white, non-Hispanics. Meditz also compared the statistics of the racial composition of the City's non-uniformed employees with the racial composition of the non-uniformed employees from the County of Essex, which maintained its County seat within the City of Newark. This comparison showed that 42.96% of the non-uniformed employees who worked for the County were white, non-Hispanics. Meditz also introduced evidence that in 2005, the percentage of white, non-Hispanics that constituted the non-uniformed employees of Essex County and 5 neighboring counties, ranged from 48.09% to 86.49%, with the percentages of white, non-Hispanics employed in the private labor force in those same counties being only slightly lower. The trial court, however, granted the City's motion for summary judgment, and tossed Meditz's lawsuit, concluding that "these statistics, standing alone, do not constitute sufficient evidence of a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern."On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the trial court had misapplied the law and had failed to lend the appropriate weight to Meditz's statistical evidence. Specifically, the Court held that "Meditz offered statistical evidence showing that the percentage of white, non-Hispanics employed by Newark was lower than the population of white, non-Hispanics in the general population of Newark. Meditz also offered statistics showing the percentage of white, non-Hispanics in surrounding areas both for the general population and for the private and government work forces. Finally, Meditz offered evidence of the percentage of white, non-Hispanics employed by the Essex County government in Newark. Out of all these percentages, the lowest was the percentage of white, non-Hispanics employed by the City of Newark. This compilation of statistics supported Meditz's claim that white, non-Hispanics were under-represented in Newark's non-uniformed work force." This case provides an excellent illustration of how a disparate impact theory of discrimination under Title VII can be invaluable tool for an individual who believes he or she has been subjected to unlawful discrimination, because in these cases, evidence of discriminatory intent or bias on behalf of the employer is not required. All that a plaintiff needs in order to be successful is to establish a differential employment outcome or treatment that is based upon race, sex, religion, or national origin, which can be proven through statistical analysis and statistical deviations. After all, the numbers don't lie. You can read the Third Circuit's full opinion in Meditz v. City of Newark here: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/102442p.pdf

Filming Co-workers In Partial State of Undress is Bad.... In Case You Didn't Know

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In the legal world, common sense and the law do not always go hand-in-hand.  Sometimes what seems practically logical or predictable will not be legally sustainable (or vice-versa).  But, on those rare occasions when the law and common sense can exist side-by-side without destroying each other like sparring gladiators, it can be refreshing. 
This is one of those moments.  In the recent case of Jane Doe v. Luzerne County, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a claim brought by a deputy sheriff who alleged that her supervisors and co-workers in the Luzerne County Sheriff's office violated her Right to Privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment when they surreptitiously videotaped her partially nude, showed the video and still photographs to other co-workers in the department, and then stored the files on a county computer where any county employee who had access to the network could find and view them.  The district court had thrown out Jane Doe's Right to Privacy claim, finding that while the actions of Doe's supervisor and co-worker in making the video, were "likely ill-conceived and definitely poorly executed," they did not "fall within the zone of privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." (Yes, you read that correctly). 
One day, Jane Doe, a Luzerne County deputy sheriff, and her partner entered a residence to serve a bench warrant, only to discover the inside of the residence strewn with garbage and at least one dead animal (a cat)  observed on the floor.  Doe and her partner soon found themselves crawling with fleas.  They radioed back to the Sheriff's Department for instructions on how to handle the flea exposure, and were told to proceed to a local Emergency Management Building (EMB), and wait there in their police cruiser until EMB personnel could construct a temporary decontamination shower and until their supervisors arrived.
After arriving at the EMB, Doe and her partner were met by Arthur Bobbouine, Chief Deputy of the Department and Deputy Ryan Foy, both of whom were Doe's supervisors.  Foy brought a video camera and immediately began to film Doe and her partner, who were still sitting in their police cruiser with the windows rolled up.  Foy testified that he was videotaping the proceedings for training purposes, and both Bobbouine and Foy instructed Doe and her partner that they had to remain inside the cruiser until the decontamination shower was constructed.  
Unfortunately, the EMB personnel were unable to construct the decontamination shower, so Bobbouine instructed Doe and her partner to drive to a nearby hospital, which was equipped with a decontamination facility.  After getting to the hospital and sitting in the cruiser for another forty-five minutes (as ordered), Doe finally entered the hospital with Foy videotaping her the entire way.  Doe testified that throughout her time in the cruiser, both at the EMB and the hospital, and during her walk into the hospital, she repeatedly asked Foy to stop filming, but he refused, stating it was for training purposes. 
Doe proceeded to the decontamination shower room, closed the door behind her, undressed and showered without incident.  When she finished showering, however, she noticed that there were no towels in the decontamination area - only a roll of thin tissue paper, of the kind that covers examination tables in doctors' offices.  A female Sheriff's Deputy, Joyce, instructed Doe through the closed door to wrap the hospital paper around her private areas so that Joyce could enter the room, examine Doe and ensure that all of the fleas had been removed.  Doe wrapped the paper around her private areas, but testified that either the paper itself was semi-transparent, and/or that her wet body caused the paper to become semi-transparent after she wrapped it around herself.  
Joyce entered the decontamination room, and closed the door behind her, but was unable to lock it, as the door was not equipped with a lock.  With Doe standing with her back to the door, Joyce began to inspect Doe for fleas.  Doe testified that at this point, most of her back, shoulders and legs were completely exposed, with only the semi-transparent paper wrapped around her buttocks and breasts. 
As Joyce was examining Doe for fleas, Foy opened the door to the decontamination room approximately one foot and began surreptitiously filming Doe.  Doe was then startled to hear Bobbouine's voice behind her saying "What's that shit all over your back?" in a reference to Doe's back tattoo.  Doe instinctively turned, saw the two men and yelled at them to leave the decontamination room.  Doe later testified that the video captured someone saying that he could see her "boobies," and that somebody should grab something to "cover [Doe] up."  Doe also testified that her buttocks were visible through the wet paper and that Bobbouine had made a statement (also allegedly captured on video) that he "could see [Doe's] ass."  
Joyce again closed the door to the decontamination room behind the men, and finished her examination of Doe.  After which, Doe left the hospital in scrubs. 
Later that same day, Foy uploaded the video he took of Doe onto his County work computer and showed the footage to several male and female officers.  At least one officer testified that Foy had displayed a still image of Doe's bare buttocks.  Foy then saved several still images (including one showing the tattoo on Doe's back) and the video he took that day in a public computer file, entitled "Brian's ass," which Doe testified could have been viewed by anyone who had access to the Luzerne County computer network.  Of the two still images Foy saved that depicted Doe, both showed the visible outline of her buttocks, covered only by thin, wet hospital paper. 
Doe sued the County, claiming that the actions of Foy and Bobbouine violated not only her Right to Privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  Doe also claimed that the County was liable for an alleged failure to train their officers. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that, on these facts, the district court committed error by dismissing Doe's Right to Privacy claim.  While noting that "the issue of whether one may have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this circuit," the Court unambiguously found that "Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the Decontamination Area, particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite sex," and that the facts did not "support the assertion that Doe expressly or implicitly consented to Bobbouine and Foy opening the door or filming the events inside the Decontamination Area."  The Court noted that there was also a dispute of material fact as to which of Doe's body parts were exposed to Bobbouine and Foy - Doe had presented evidence that her unexposed breasts and buttocks were revealed to Bobbouine and Foy, while the County had argued that only Doe's back, shoulders, arms and legs were exposed.  As such, the Court determined that dismissal of Doe's claim in light of this factual dispute was improper. 
The Court also found that the following factors all weighed in favor of finding a Right to Privacy for Doe under these circumstances: (1) the video and pictures may have included images of Doe's exposed breasts and/or buttocks; (2) the potential harm to Doe of dissemination of non-consensual disclosure of those images or video over the Internet was great; (3) the context of the disclosure of the video and images at her work and to her co-workers could increase the harm suffered by Doe; and (4) there were inadequate safeguards imposed against non-consensual disclosure because Foy had uploaded the video and images to a public file where anyone with network access could view them. 
Consequently, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court and allowed Doe's Right to Privacy claim to continue. 
So, in case anyone out there was fuzzy on this issue, videotaping your co-workers partially nude is a no-no.  
You can read the Third Circuit's full opinion in Doe v. Luzerne County here: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/103921p.pdf





28 Eylül 2012 Cuma

Legal Challenge to Haverford Township Anti-Discrimination Ordinance Continues

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Back on February 15, I reported on the new anti-discrimination ordinance passed by Haverford Township in Delaware County, PA, which not only makes it illegal for employers doing business in Haverford Township to discriminate against employees or applicants on the grounds of sex, religion, race and national origin, but also added sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression as protected classes - something that neither Pennsylvania nor the Federal Government has yet to do.
Since then, a Haverford Township resident, Fred Teal, has filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of that Ordinance, arguing it is illegal because the Township allegedly failed to follow the proper procedures in adopting it.  Mr. Teal has also argued that two of the Haverford Township Commissioners should have recused themselves from the proceedings surrounding the adoption of the Ordinance because they have homosexual relatives.  
The Delaware County Daily Times is reporting that on September 27, 2011, Judge Pagano of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas overruled the Township's preliminary objections to Mr. Teal's action, which means that for the moment, the lawsuit will continue.  The Township must now file an Answer to Mr. Teal's Complaint. 
You can read the full story from the Delaware County Daily Times here: http://delcotimes.com/articles/2011/10/10/news/doc4e92630eb4ce5699604790.txt?viewmode=fullstory

Filming Co-workers In Partial State of Undress is Bad.... In Case You Didn't Know

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In the legal world, common sense and the law do not always go hand-in-hand.  Sometimes what seems practically logical or predictable will not be legally sustainable (or vice-versa).  But, on those rare occasions when the law and common sense can exist side-by-side without destroying each other like sparring gladiators, it can be refreshing. 
This is one of those moments.  In the recent case of Jane Doe v. Luzerne County, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a claim brought by a deputy sheriff who alleged that her supervisors and co-workers in the Luzerne County Sheriff's office violated her Right to Privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment when they surreptitiously videotaped her partially nude, showed the video and still photographs to other co-workers in the department, and then stored the files on a county computer where any county employee who had access to the network could find and view them.  The district court had thrown out Jane Doe's Right to Privacy claim, finding that while the actions of Doe's supervisor and co-worker in making the video, were "likely ill-conceived and definitely poorly executed," they did not "fall within the zone of privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." (Yes, you read that correctly). 
One day, Jane Doe, a Luzerne County deputy sheriff, and her partner entered a residence to serve a bench warrant, only to discover the inside of the residence strewn with garbage and at least one dead animal (a cat)  observed on the floor.  Doe and her partner soon found themselves crawling with fleas.  They radioed back to the Sheriff's Department for instructions on how to handle the flea exposure, and were told to proceed to a local Emergency Management Building (EMB), and wait there in their police cruiser until EMB personnel could construct a temporary decontamination shower and until their supervisors arrived.
After arriving at the EMB, Doe and her partner were met by Arthur Bobbouine, Chief Deputy of the Department and Deputy Ryan Foy, both of whom were Doe's supervisors.  Foy brought a video camera and immediately began to film Doe and her partner, who were still sitting in their police cruiser with the windows rolled up.  Foy testified that he was videotaping the proceedings for training purposes, and both Bobbouine and Foy instructed Doe and her partner that they had to remain inside the cruiser until the decontamination shower was constructed.  
Unfortunately, the EMB personnel were unable to construct the decontamination shower, so Bobbouine instructed Doe and her partner to drive to a nearby hospital, which was equipped with a decontamination facility.  After getting to the hospital and sitting in the cruiser for another forty-five minutes (as ordered), Doe finally entered the hospital with Foy videotaping her the entire way.  Doe testified that throughout her time in the cruiser, both at the EMB and the hospital, and during her walk into the hospital, she repeatedly asked Foy to stop filming, but he refused, stating it was for training purposes. 
Doe proceeded to the decontamination shower room, closed the door behind her, undressed and showered without incident.  When she finished showering, however, she noticed that there were no towels in the decontamination area - only a roll of thin tissue paper, of the kind that covers examination tables in doctors' offices.  A female Sheriff's Deputy, Joyce, instructed Doe through the closed door to wrap the hospital paper around her private areas so that Joyce could enter the room, examine Doe and ensure that all of the fleas had been removed.  Doe wrapped the paper around her private areas, but testified that either the paper itself was semi-transparent, and/or that her wet body caused the paper to become semi-transparent after she wrapped it around herself.  
Joyce entered the decontamination room, and closed the door behind her, but was unable to lock it, as the door was not equipped with a lock.  With Doe standing with her back to the door, Joyce began to inspect Doe for fleas.  Doe testified that at this point, most of her back, shoulders and legs were completely exposed, with only the semi-transparent paper wrapped around her buttocks and breasts. 
As Joyce was examining Doe for fleas, Foy opened the door to the decontamination room approximately one foot and began surreptitiously filming Doe.  Doe was then startled to hear Bobbouine's voice behind her saying "What's that shit all over your back?" in a reference to Doe's back tattoo.  Doe instinctively turned, saw the two men and yelled at them to leave the decontamination room.  Doe later testified that the video captured someone saying that he could see her "boobies," and that somebody should grab something to "cover [Doe] up."  Doe also testified that her buttocks were visible through the wet paper and that Bobbouine had made a statement (also allegedly captured on video) that he "could see [Doe's] ass."  
Joyce again closed the door to the decontamination room behind the men, and finished her examination of Doe.  After which, Doe left the hospital in scrubs. 
Later that same day, Foy uploaded the video he took of Doe onto his County work computer and showed the footage to several male and female officers.  At least one officer testified that Foy had displayed a still image of Doe's bare buttocks.  Foy then saved several still images (including one showing the tattoo on Doe's back) and the video he took that day in a public computer file, entitled "Brian's ass," which Doe testified could have been viewed by anyone who had access to the Luzerne County computer network.  Of the two still images Foy saved that depicted Doe, both showed the visible outline of her buttocks, covered only by thin, wet hospital paper. 
Doe sued the County, claiming that the actions of Foy and Bobbouine violated not only her Right to Privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  Doe also claimed that the County was liable for an alleged failure to train their officers. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that, on these facts, the district court committed error by dismissing Doe's Right to Privacy claim.  While noting that "the issue of whether one may have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this circuit," the Court unambiguously found that "Doe had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the Decontamination Area, particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite sex," and that the facts did not "support the assertion that Doe expressly or implicitly consented to Bobbouine and Foy opening the door or filming the events inside the Decontamination Area."  The Court noted that there was also a dispute of material fact as to which of Doe's body parts were exposed to Bobbouine and Foy - Doe had presented evidence that her unexposed breasts and buttocks were revealed to Bobbouine and Foy, while the County had argued that only Doe's back, shoulders, arms and legs were exposed.  As such, the Court determined that dismissal of Doe's claim in light of this factual dispute was improper. 
The Court also found that the following factors all weighed in favor of finding a Right to Privacy for Doe under these circumstances: (1) the video and pictures may have included images of Doe's exposed breasts and/or buttocks; (2) the potential harm to Doe of dissemination of non-consensual disclosure of those images or video over the Internet was great; (3) the context of the disclosure of the video and images at her work and to her co-workers could increase the harm suffered by Doe; and (4) there were inadequate safeguards imposed against non-consensual disclosure because Foy had uploaded the video and images to a public file where anyone with network access could view them. 
Consequently, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court and allowed Doe's Right to Privacy claim to continue. 
So, in case anyone out there was fuzzy on this issue, videotaping your co-workers partially nude is a no-no.  
You can read the Third Circuit's full opinion in Doe v. Luzerne County here: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/103921p.pdf





US Supreme Court: First Amendment Bars Discrimination Suits By Ministers Against Religious Employers

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Yesterday, in the case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, adopted and sanctioned the "ministerial exception" rule that has been utilized by the Federal Courts of Appeals for 40 years, which provides that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit ministers, priests, and other religious individuals from suing their ecclesiastical employers for employment discrimination.  In short, the Court held that the First Amendment's prohibition on the government's establishment of religion and its guarantee of free exercise and worship prohibit such lawsuits because religious organizations are free to choose which ministers they want to lead and guide their congregation, without interference or the threat of forced-reinstatement or monetary damages imposed by the courts or the government. 


This case centered around Cheryl Perich, who was a "called" teacher of students from kindergarten to eighth-grade for the Hosanna-Tabor Church.  The Church has two categories of teachers that it employs: "called" teachers and "lay" teachers.  "Called" teachers are required by the Church to complete certain academic requirements, including an eight-class course of theological study at a Lutheran college or university, an endorsement of the teacher's local Church district, and the successful passage of an oral examination by Church faculty.  Once these requirements are met, the teacher may be "called" by the congregation, upon which the teacher formally receives from the Church the title of "Minister of Religion, Commissioned."  "Lay" teachers, on the other hand, are not required to be Lutheran or to be trained by the Church.  The Church only appoints "lay" teachers when no "called" teachers are available. 


Perich, as a "called" teacher, had completed all of the above requirements, and taught both religious and secular curriculum to her students at the Church.  Her duties also involved activities such as leading students in prayer exercises daily, attending weekly school-wide chapel services and even leading those chapel services approximately twice each year.  


In June of 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy, and began the 2004-2005 school year on disability leave.  On January 25, 2005, Perich notified the school principal that she was ready to return to work.  The principal, however, informed Perich that the school had already contracted with a "lay" teacher to fill Perich's position, expressing concern that Perich would not be able to return to the classroom.  On January 30, the Church held a congregation at which the school's administrators concluded that Perich was physically unable to return to her job either that school year or the next, and requested that Perich resign from her position as a "called" teacher. 


Perich refused to resign and produced a note from her doctor indicating that she would be physically able to return to work on February 22, 2005.  On that date, Perich arrived at the school and the principal asked her to leave.  Later that day, the principal telephoned Perich and told her that she was likely going to be fired.  Perich responded that she had contacted an attorney and intended to pursue her legal rights. 


On April 10, 2005, a congregation of the Church was convened, and voted to rescind Perich's call in light of the "regrettable" actions that had occurred in February.  The next day, the school board terminated Perich's employment on the grounds of "insubordination and disruptive behavior," and because of the damage she had done to her "working relationship" with the school by "threatening to take legal action."


Perich then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she had been terminated from her employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Perich claimed that the Church had unlawfully retaliated against her for threatening to file a lawsuit under the ADA in February of 2005.


In a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court held that Perich's suit, which originally sought reinstatement to her position as a "called" teacher, or alternative damages for back-pay, front-pay and punitive damages, was barred by the First Amendment's ministerial exception.  Chief Justice John Roberts, in writing for the Court, engaged in detailed examination of the history and origination of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and found that they had been adopted against the backdrop of the British Crown's historical interference and control over the appointment of ecclesiastical ministers.  


The Court also noted that its own past decisions have reinforced the rule that governmental actions that have the effect of contradicting or interceding in a religious organization's decision as to who shall serve as a minister and under what conditions or circumstances, are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  The same holds true, the Court concluded, with employment discrimination actions brought by ministers against their former religious employers.  The Court held that: "[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.  Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments."


Finding that Perich was clearly a minister under the facts and circumstances surrounding her acceptance as a "called" teacher, and the fact that both Perich and the Church had held her out to the public as a minister during the years of her employment, the Supreme Court dismissed Perich's claim for retaliation under the ADA as unconstitutional. 


You can read the Supreme Court's full opinion in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf

How to create a dispute condo 3 tips to solve

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Users sent you to resolve conflicts with your neighbors condo, Board members and management agent.Difficulty ArticleLearn: EasyInstructions1It seems a paradox: to use the advantages of independence in a condo you must accept the cost of interdependence. Must comply with the rules of the House and agree with the Board members, neighbors and agents of management that can make your life more enjoyable or more courses of miserable.Of, the vast majority of the condo owners understand the need for clear rules and the role of members of the Council and management agent in the application your. Little conflict really is condominium "there" should have done. Most conflicts are on "how people communicate." If for some reason all condominium owners feel feedback is less important than the rules of the House, it is very easy to feel resentment and therefore hostile. At this point is the fact that the House rules are clear and may not be sufficient reasonable, to prevent that personal war.It always in the best interests of the owner members of the management board by a clear the condominium, disputes with neighbours or agent as soon as possible the and solve effective communication. Most of the time is difficult and more expensive any solution. Accordingly it lets you know what we can do to calm and the # 1-wallet.Tip care: DownWhen quiet our minds are filled with anger, problems inevitably seem much larger than you really are. In addition, the anger is contagious. Their anger fomenting trouble by someone else and pretty fast blows the situation out of control. If you want to remain calm and good its you, it is to do one thing: first start and lead by example. Usually works and help costs notHung. 2Tip # 2: know what you are prepared WantBefore with neighbors, a member of the management board or the Manager of the establishment. Here are some questions you need questions following question: what exactly is the problem? • What do you want your audience to specifically? • Think what makes that you appropriate victim? What are • your case back solutions? • in conditions rather somewhere elsewhere sell your home and life? 3Tip # 3: know how you get what you want condominium owners have several options for resolving conflicts. Each option consists of an increasing number of time and money and can be used before the next one.Obviously, the first option is to work on the things themselves. Ideally, the result should be achieved that anyone with life and is compatible with the rules of the House. A large number of conflicts in this way can be solved, provided that the parties have enough communication and negotiation is second option skills.The seeking the assistance of a professional mediator litigation know condo. Mediation is a process session which are Contracting Parties do not agree with a neutral party, and facilitate negotiation between them, to reach an agreement. The Ombudsman has no decision-making power. The parties decide to resolve your problem of mutually acceptable way. Have to discuss the possibility to maintain as your condo, relationship through communication is more effective and respectfully.The third option arbitration. The condominium dispute is a neutral subject to arbitrator reviews evidence, hear Parteienund finally makes a decision. It is inevitable, won a part, and the other loses. Arbitration may be binding or not binding. In the first case award of the arbitrator shall be final and cannot access RechtsmittEl brought. In the latter case a party can go means trial scratch.The dishes for a trial de novo in plain English, fourth option to the Tribunal. As the referee, the judge makes a decision based on facts (who did what, when, where and how) and the law. Condo owners, finish the Tribunal has two sweaters of Principauxaccusés reception. First, there is always an adverse effect on future relations between the parties. Secondly, it can be very expensive in terms of time, money and headaches. However, the dispute is a viable option for condo owners who are particularly angry or disputes that cannot be resolved otherwise.

What's the Real Cost?

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With the increase in Federal agency initiatives targeting employers, such as I-9 audits or independent contractor classification audits, employers face increased scrutiny. In addition, disgruntled current or former employees are free to lodge complaints with State and Federal agencies that may spark an investigation. In either case, an employer faces potential liability, as very few employers are capable of keeping up with the myriad of employment laws. In reality, most employers try to remain compliant with employment laws, but if the government looks hard enough, it is likely to find a violation or two.
What’s the cost of a claim? It might be fines for incomplete I-9s, unpaid taxes for misclassification of workers, overtime for unpaid wages or a need to change employment practices. But, the biggest cost is usually legal fees. It is a best practice to hire counsel when an employer faces a government investigation, employee claim or audit. Contacting counsel before reacting/responding to a claim is prudent, but it does create an expense. Moreover, a disgruntled employee is likely to have an attorney herself. When an employee has an attorney, that attorney will likely make a demand for some kind of monetary compensation for whatever wrong the employee alleges. The demand ordinarily includes the payment of that employee’s attorney’s fees.
Most Federal discrimination laws allow for the recovery of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party”. In a case that goes to litigation, this can mean that the employee’s attorney will ask the court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees”. Typically, the employee’s will ask that the court award attorney’s fees in excess of $100,000. Even in cases that settle, employees expect their attorney’s fees to be paid by the employer, which again can add up to significant amounts of money even in a case that is considered suspect.
In a recent Federal employment discrimination case, a jury awarded an employee $110,000 in damages for the employer’s retaliation for her protesting unlawful employment practices. The employee asked the court for an award of attorney’s fees. Although the employee also brought two other unsuccessful claims (one for gender discrimination and one under the FMLA) that the jury rejected, the judge in that case awarded the employee $250,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. Think about it: her attorney’s fees award more than doubled the amount of actual damages that the jury awarded to her. The judge reasoned that the winning claim (retaliation) was “intertwined” with her other discrimination claims such that she was entitled to all of her attorney’s fees.
What is the lesson learned from this illustrative case? Be proactive as an employer. Conduct regular training for both employees and management, including on topics such as harassment. In addition, conduct a self-audit of internal recordkeeping, policies and procedures, etc. If you find violations on your own, it’s cheaper and easier to correct with the assistance of counsel than when your company is facing a claim or audit. Finally, while not all claims are avoidable despite best efforts, if the company has taken proactive steps such as those mentioned above, it can mitigate its exposure and can reduce the number of claims. After all, paying someone else’s attorney’s fees doesn’t exactly help the bottom line.

27 Eylül 2012 Perşembe

How to search for in legislative codes

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Legal research with legislative codes is one of the most direct ways to make your inquiries in the law. Codes are legislative, what make up of the State of most laws and deliver the information you need on the laws you must follow.Difficulty residents and tourists: moderately EasyInstructionsHow to search for the legal Codes1Choose how needed for search for the code use. Lexus Nexus, a popular online that help you search index can search for legislative codes be very expensive. Have access to Lexus Nexus, you simplify your search. Other methods for finding code contained a code provided therein, is the legislative codes, printed books and not commented code found in print or online 2If. you want to run your search with Lexus Nexus, choose a type of search "Topic" and in nature, to search for. If you are looking for code in a particular Member State, this State count. Your search results will provide, and you can data. 3Use table of contents on the annotated or not commented code for your search, use analyze. You which section best code fits determine 4Look research conduct. table popular name of the code to help to determine which section of code will better support the search for. Table of popular names, you can find code on important words. 5Turn section or sections you want to use use for your research and analyze sections for certain entries that apply to your case.

Using a server

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Presented ArticleWhen is the user that a server process it at your door generally use some form of legal document, it is to visit a subpoena, court or claim against you. Our first instinct is to hide their because we believe that we not incorrectly have something. However, you must understand that the server is deliver your documents; This is the responsibility of the Earth are intended to serve you. Here are a few suggestions on how to handle a server.Difficulty process: EasyInstructions1Be polished and accept that what you are used. Why? Because the server process an affidavit of the Court indicating that file must you have served them, and were you determine how you receive. This can impact your credibility as a party in the skin of action 2Don legal, coming, can not someone to your door 3Don you are you have and say you are not at home or if more life may not. You could justice. 4If with obstruction burdened, avoid you over a period of time and then you are finally able to serve you when you arrive, the judge do not say you didn't know you were looking for you, that your home never before had. Each visit, the server is registered, and the judge already knows the truth. 5Don of legal process server issues can't because you are not authorized to give legal advice. You need a lawyer to do get this.

How to break a boxing

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See a fight is not a pretty sight. The essence of combat is brutal and scary. Learn the right way to respond to break a fight. Commitment to avoid prison could save the life of a person or unnecessary time.Difficulty: Security ChallengingInstructions1Alert or call 911 if a fight brewing. It is the more secure thing you can do, for you and the people fight. 2Understand any involvement in the fight in pursuit, lead could, even if you try to help, personal injury or even to death. Carefully decide whether affecting it. 3If you will decide should get involved, speak backorder the quieter of the problem. Walk from this situation and the person who is ready to fight seems. Can shout the person and let your anger, but keep it away from aggressor. 4Keep speak and enable security or the police for help. Move and try the individual attention to you. Accept the fact that the offender may be very angry at you, to intervene, but it is later thank you, if the dispute settled. 5Have plan out where the situation out of control device.

The Kentucky law foreclosure general security agreement

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Acts of the General security assigning property rights and are the most common types of acts of real estate. The Act also provides a guarantee that the property has a clear title and that it is a marketable property. Lawton Kentucky locking is a State of the doctrine of privilege. Real estate is used to obtain loans. Locking power sales to an act or a trust is not allowed. Lenders must grant an order judicial verb Court, recover a property. Owners have used 20 days appeal to sell before you apply in the absence of a TransferWhether loan.Ownership a package also called real estate, real estate in the open market or sold in an auction; the lock that is general warranty deed transfer the property. The law is on the mortgage holder transferred until sold the property at auction on free market.Deed, the ValidityA file are recorded in the Office local Registrar County, the valid and legally binding. The document must be signed in the lock and notarized by all parties. The property, or transfers of foreclosure follows covenants or provisions to the original action when it is sold.

Florida laws on the exploitation of the elderly

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Elderly can be vulnerable to exploitation by persons you trust. Florida, financial exploitation to commit physical abuse and neglect of older adults is a serious crime. Financial ExploitationChapter 825 of Florida Statute regulates the financial exploitation of the elderly. An elderly person is defined as an adult, at least 60 years and "suffers from weaknesses of aging." Weaknesses cause that those who make it difficult to ensure for themselves, to the extent where it becomes dependent on others. It is, if a person in a position of trust or in a business relationship with the elderly, received money or assets of "deception or intimidation laws of Florida TypesUnder 825.103 .section (2), exploitation of the elderly is a criminal offence." If the value of the property or assets is $100,000 or more, it is a first-degree crime. It is less than $100.00, but less than $ 20,000, is a crime of second degree. If less than $ 20,000, it is a crime of the third degree.Protective ServicesChapter 415 of State which services act Florida - adult protection - abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly. 415.102 (7) Section of the laws of Florida, exploitation is loud when someone trust deliberately deprived its assets or property a person. Examples of this type of operation if a health care provider, the guardian or trustee of a person who intentionally or negligently funds.HotlineThe person branch Florida children departed with a hotline for calls to the possibility of abuse, neglect or exploitation of the elderly family services (DCF). After receiving a complaint DCF explores the relationship and determine which measuen you increase the protection of vulnerable adults.

26 Eylül 2012 Çarşamba

Information about older people do violence in Texas

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Elder abuse is a crime. To the seriousness of the case, the author becomes a first second burdened or third degree. There are a number of programs in the State of Texas to ensure that seniors from such abuse is protected. Definition Texas law provides that the older abuse as any form of physical, sexual and emotional neglect is defined or exploitation to a person aged 65 and more. Exploitation occurs when the family members or persons close to the elderly have access to your assets and use them win personal property. Negligence is when the physical and emotional needs, an elderly person not supported. According to 21.08 Texas Penal Code, section a person of sexual abuse guilty makeup will, when it engaged in any kind of sexual activity with a person without consent.ReportingIf who live aware is as a Texas that a person who is damaged and is not reported are condemned by that person of a criminal offence of the class b family ministries and protection services regulates the reports of elder abuse. A resident may submit a report that person DFPS confidentially.ChargesA voluntarily inflicts heavy physical person guilty recognized with a first-degree crime. Operation of an elderly person is considered a crime of third degree.

Limitation period for a trustee

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Restrictions apply to the Elimination of the trustees or limit to remove the Court. Combinations can therefore be brought to the Board of Trustees, the suspicion on misconduct regardless, how long before what had happened to suppress. Prescription BackgroundThe defines the amount of legal actions can be taken. Trusts and real estate law limitations applied until recently all types of proceedings against the trustee. This changed in 2009 in a case decided some actions against the trustees can be however long the happened.TrusteesTrustees misconduct hold a position of trust, honesty and good faith. If this trust raped and brought a claim is filed, the limitation period applies. In Conte V Ditta has been proven it, that the real estate fund trustee had misappropriated. Instead of suing for money, the plaintiff was removal of the trustee. The defence argues, misconduct happened four years ago, but the Court came to the conclusion that without relevance and allowed claim.LegislationThis case in a legal move 113.082 (a), led trust code granted to remove the power of a court, the Board of Trustees "Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz behaviors as well as some other cause." Since then the limits apply only to the trustee to seek recovery of funds and damage.

How to delete a load of threat in Indiana?

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A threat is bullying made criminals in Indiana can be. Threats are included in the legal field of intimidation. If you are looking for threat to file charges can be done with the help of local law enforcement. DefinitionThe definition is that a threat of Indiana-35-45-2-1-C-code "expression through words or actions of intention: illegal injury, property damage to health or to force a person..." Bullying of the code sets eight features of what is seen as a threat. There is free but different levels of threat. The offence can a crime category A, class C and D class are considered. The highest of these charges a crime category C and face is doomed, a sentence.Filing ChargesAccording at Indiana State Troopers Kathleen Zegaronski prison to file charges victims contact the local authorities in the jurisdiction where the threat is made. Call a complaint to the police station or Office Sheriff complete lists the party name and accused of the nature of the threats that have been made. Authorities provide evidence of the threat. The police will investigate the threat and charge the party responsible for, if there is sufficient evidence. If there must be an immediate danger, the victim contact 911 fee charges are stored for quick response.After FiledAfter police are, with trial the accused. If you were the victim, you talk that the filing of a protection order against an accused as another form of protection to the public prosecutor's Office. If the order is granted the protection, the accused should be a certain distance of the victim at any time. Victims can using the run einerClerk and are able to obtain a copy of the online forms.

Find in Indiana for a security freeze

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Indiana Act, the consumer may request your credit report security freeze. A security freeze means that the reporting organization release cannot report the credit to the consumer without his consent. Bezeichnetein require consumers to freeze, a security by he a letter to the credit reporting agency a call make your should or email through a secure electronic connection.TimingThe Agency the gel to the consumer for five days following receipt of the request for request.ExceptionsThe credit credit report can denied reports, if the agency determines place that it is fraudulent or when it clearly from the individual can confirm demand is their credit report requested.ConfirmationWithin 10 days to the credit reporting agency must send the written confirmation of freezing of safety for consumers. The Agency must provide a unique personal identification number (PIN) or password. The PIN or password might not consumers or part of the social security number. The confirmation must also include instructions how the consumer can release its specific parts that referenced credit report and how can temporarily raise it, or remove the gel. Gel may not be lifted unless the consumer authorizes the credit notification to the Agency.

Violence and civil liability

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Police officers, as well as the States and counties which employ, can in civil proceedings to excessive use of violence, not only to the State, but also in the Federal Court is responsible. ForceExcessive force can include personal battery, extreme restrictions and the unnecessary use of a weapon. The use of deadly force, or any action that the attacker die translated often leads to a civilian suit.State StatuteUnder status, an officer negligent or intentional tort never use excessive force for tort is used can be held liable. However, some countries, such as Texas, have a special exception: the civil liability for those in itself Act to prevent - defence .Federal StatuteUsing force 42 U.S. code section 1983 may be considered a violation of civil rights of individuals under the title. This law was written specifically to address lack of police and civil liability due to any of these actions create.